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National Form and the Question of Identity
Notwithstanding the fact that the topic of the conference, the birth of 
the Georgian nation, seems to suggest that empirical and historical research-
es would be more relevant for it than philosophical reflections, I will still at-
tempt to look at the task from a philosophical perspective. And I will begin 
with a philosophical dictum: it can be claimed that the discussion about the 
origin of the nation implies an anticipation of the end of the national form. 
To quote a famous phrase from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right1, the owl of Min-
erva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk. Those innovative re-
searches, without which one can hardly imagine any discussion about nations 
and nationalism today, have been produced during the past 50, especially, past 
25 years (I will once again name some of those who we have repeatedly quot-
ed during this conference: Anderson, Gellner, Smith, Hobsbawm, Brubaker). 
When the signs of decomposition of the national form are clearly seen, one 
starts thinking where it originated and what was its origin2. 
For the start I will offer a definition of identity, which fully complies 
with the Aristotelian requirements for the definition (i.e., as we may recall, 
species is defined with the help of genus and specific property): Identity is a 
form of sameness based on self-interpretation. Etymologically identity, identitas, 
comes from the word idem, the same. But unlike those forms of sameness 
which are characteristic for, say, objects, identity implies the sameness which 
is characteristic for the “self-interpreting animal” (that is how Charles Taylor 
defines the human being). Identity means not a set of objectively given fea-
tures but rather my relation towards “a set of features”. The relation depends 
on understanding, interpretation. This definition is formulated with a view of 
avoiding reductive understandings of identity3.
I would note here that the popularization of the concept of identity it-
self took place in the 50s of the previous century. Erik Erikson, a renowned 
psychoanalyst, playing a decisive role in the process, introducing the concept 
in order to apply psychoanalytic categories to historical and social processes4. 
The syntagm “identity crisis”, as far as I know, was coined by him. It referred 
to the inability of the American society of his times to provide its members 
with an identity which would enable them to overcome conflicts of child-
hood and adolescence. 
One could distinguish individual and collective identities - the individ-
ual comprising the domain of the experiences related to one’s own body, as 
well as the entirety of one’s own social roles; the collective identities are: reli-
76
Giga Zedania
gion, gender, ethnicity/nationality, sexuality, race. The collective identity nec-
essarily implies the identification with a collective image of a group. For both 
individual and collective identities the Other, the interaction with the Other, 
plays an absolutely fundamental role. I will not dwell on this issue, since it has 
been amply demonstrated from different quarters, starting with psychoana-
lysts and ending with George Herbert Mead. One’s own self can only be seen 
through the other. This is the postulate of the unavoidability of mediation. 
Two more preliminary points should be made about the concept of 
identity: 
a) individual identity is to a large extent defined by 
collective identities; the individual is defined by his or 
her participation in the interactive and communicative 
processes of the groups he or she belongs; 
b) Collective identities exist only in the individuals. I don’t 
see any necessity to hypostasize either the concept of the 
collective identity or any other concept, for that matter.
Now I shall turn to the question about the form of collective iden-
tity which corresponds to the nation. If we, following Benedict Anderson, 
will define the nation as an imagined community, what should the identity 
of this imagined and imaginary community be like?5 First of all, the mean-
ing of “imagined” is to be defined. The word “imagined” could have two dis-
tinct meanings not necessarily in harmony with each other: imagined is every 
community which extends beyond face-to-face communication. But “imag-
ined” is also a word for a society which is anonymous and impersonal. It 
is hard to estimate how successful Anderson is in distinguishing these two 
meanings of the word, but it is obvious that his definition of the nation is in-
teresting only in the case if he uses the term according to this second mean-
ing. This implies that one can designate the community as imagined, if it 
needs for its reproduction anonymous, impersonal institutions6. 
One of the functions of these reproductive institutions is to produce 
an ideological effect. Ideology here is understood as a means of imaginary 
resolution of real problems7 (Whether one could draw a parallel between the 
“imagined community” and “imaginary resolution”? This is to be farther ex-
plored). There certainly are societies where narration occupies the place of 
ideology; in most cases narration and ideology are intertwined and comple-
ment each other (ideology is conceptual, while narration does not imply con-
ceptuality). Accordingly, ideology would be an integral part of the national 
form, with the aim of imaginary harmonization of the problems of commu-
nity united within this form. Problems and tensions may be of various types: 
class, inter-communal or fundamental-existential. 
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Bearing in mind this conceptual framework, I would like to turn to 
the texts by Ilia Chavchavadze - no matter whether we regard him as the 
founder or the restorer of the Georgian nationalism - it is a fact that from 
his very first texts, both fictional and journalistic, he pursued the key goal of 
establishing such a nationalist ideology. Let us look at his main prose texts 
from this perspective. The culmination of the text in The Traveler’s Diaries is 
the conversation of the author with Lelt-Ghunia. The conversation concerns 
precisely the question of identity: 
“There on Terek’s banks stands a fortress not built with hands. That fort 
is well known as Arshi’s fort. 
— How is it not built with hands?
— It is built by God, impregnable, not to be broken. 
— Then what wouldst thou say?
— In other days Kakhetian army attacked it, fought, and took it. The 
glen thought to get help from the terrified lord. He could give them none. A 
great number of people were slain, The Kakhetians massacred man glensmen, 
they came into the fort, pulled down the standard. There was an old glensman 
there, a man famed for his wisdom. He had a daughter, not betrothed, unseen 
of the sun. This glensman decided to make the Kakhetian soldiers drunk. He 
brought wine and sent it into the fortress. He also sent his daughter, unseen 
of the sun, to the drunken feast. The Kakhetians, thirsty of wine, admirers of 
fair women, became as swine, and were completely drunk. The maid discov-
ered the keys of the fortress and let the glensmen know of the swinish state 
of the Kakhetian soldiers glensmen came and entered the Castle unperceived, 
raised cries and masacred all the drunken Kakhetians. Again the fortress fell 
into the hands of the glensmen. The Eristav of Aragva heard of this. He gave 
the castle as a reward to the maid’s father, he also gave him a charter... 
— What sort of bravery was there in that? 
— Why not? That is cunning; where force cannot prevail, there cun-
ning persuades. 
— What canst thou say to this massacre of Kakhetians?
— Now all Georgians are brothers. I am not speaking of Kakhetians 
in enmity. This I want thee to understand, that formerly if we gave our lives 
in service there were rewards, there were great gifts; we found our livelihood 
in glory and in deeds of heroism, a man did not live in vain. Now we have to 
find our livelihood in lying, immorality, perjury and betraying one another.”8
I would like to draw the attention to the fact that here we see a sort of 
performative contradiction - Lelt-Ghunia speaks in a regional dialect and, 
moreover, speaks of animosity and fight between Georgia’s various regions. 
What is remarkable is that through this the narrator wants to express the 
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national identity. I would hereby recall that the main function of a national 
identity is the homogenization of carriers of this identity, their unification 
according to a national feature, the downplaying of the conflicts within the 
nation; hegemonization, to apply a neo-Marxist term.
Looking at such prosaic works by Ilia Chavchavadze as On the Gallows, 
The Tale of a Poor Man, Otar’s Widow, one will see the transformation of the 
same problem. First, we deal here with the effort to neutralize a class conflict 
by the national form, which in each case is doomed to failure. Apart from the 
class conflict, however, some texts contain what Benedict Anderson refers to 
as “fatality” (suffering, disease, death) as a thematic problem. Anderson asso-
ciates the birth of a phenomenon of nationalism with the weakening of the 
importance of the Christian religion as the grand narrative of legitimization, 
which is being substituted by national narrative which should take over the 
function of interpreting and justifying the fatalities. But these fatalities also 
remain ‘unresolved’ and ‘without sublation’ in Chavchavadze’s works, espe-
cially in Otar’s Widow.
One may argue that if Ilia’s texts do not show an imaginary resolu-
tion of real problems, this might not have been the goal he pursued. But 
this would be a wrong assumption. In Otar’s Widow again we see the effort 
of this resolution - the well-known passage towards the end of the work, in 
the dialogue between its two personages, Archil and Keso, is nothing else 
but the attempt to provide the solution to the real - class-related - problems 
on the level of the imaginary. But the resolution here is given in the future 
as a promise. The promise is always an expression of an excess, of a utopian 
energy which should mobilize; but at the same time it reflects an incompli-
ance of the situation in which it emerges to the desired one. I would note 
here that Chavchavadze, who is unequivocally perceived as the father of the 
Georgian nationalism both by Georgian primordialists and modernists, with 
all its psychoanalytical connotations, provides a much weaker form of the na-
tional narrative than one would imagine. I would like to stress the fact that 
here we deal not with a deconstruction of a strong narrative, where signs of 
weakness would have been discovered in the demonstrations of its strength, 
but the admittance - especially in his later works - that this strong ideologi-
cal dimension of the national narrative cannot be materialized (of course, I 
understand that such a direct link between fictional texts and political pro-
cesses is problematic, but a linking phenomenon between them is the ideol-
ogy, which justifies this link, though perhaps not the speed with which I es-
tablished this link). 
How does ideology work? It transforms identity - not as a result of 
hovering conceptualization or narrative but as the product of its institution-
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alization (I would note here that this institutionalization basically takes place 
in mass media and schools). Two things are important for a philosopher 
here: the ideology leads not to the explication of identity (i.e. exposing that 
which exists implicitly, latently) but rather imagination or invention. Here 
one should distinguish between approaches that stress invention and fabri-
cation (Hobsbawm91) and those that accentuate imagination (Anderson). The 
point is that the birth of any nationalism is directly linked to the phenome-
non of the alien - the alien, which is not external and accidental for this iden-
tity but represents an essential moment of it. Accordingly, an alien is embed-
ded in a national identity as something that makes this identity collect and 
unite. This process of unification and establishment will never be the identi-
cal with that initial condition when the contact with the alien did not exist. 
Following the law of philosophy, the expression is always more than what is 
to be expressed - because the expression brings in the universe of concepts 
and meanings that cannot be controlled by any subject.
National form is not of one type. In the literature usually two types of 
nationalism are distinguished - ethnic and civic. Which of them will develop 
depends on whether the birth of a state precedes the development of a nation 
or follows it. For example, in France the birth of the state was followed by the 
birth of the nation, therefore, the nationalism developed within the state and 
its institutions. France, then, is treated as a paradigm of civic nationalism. In 
Germany, on the other hand, the stir-up of national sentiments preceded the 
birth of the state and therefore, it took an ethno-cultural form. The issue of 
membership of these two communities is determined accordingly: in France 
it is political belonging, i.e. citizenship, while in Germany it depends on the 
ethnic origin. As Brubaker notes, in Germany the “imaginary community” of 
nationhood and institutional realities of statehood were clearly separated; in 
France they are welded. In Germany, nationhood was an ethno-cultural fact 
whilst in France it was political10. 
This difference is an interesting one. But lately more and more voices 
argue against it. One of the reasons of criticism is that the distinction be-
tween a “good” civic and “bad” ethnic nationalism does not seem to be fair. 
E. g. result of a “good” civic nationalism is the policy of assimilation of mi-
norities - the example of France). But a more important argument is the fol-
lowing: nationalism necessarily presupposes an ethnic ‘moment’ for designat-
ing the common origin and the common descent. The phenomenon, which 
is being described by the term ‘civic nationalism’, is nothing else but the loy-
alty towards the state or patriotism. But this does by no means imply that 
the origin of nationalism does not affect its character. The tendency of the 
Georgian nationalism towards “ethnical character” is to be explained by its 
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origin - when there was no possibility of equating nation with the state - as 
was the case for Georgians in the Russian empire - language, ethnicity and 
religion were taken as the defining moments of identity. If we look at today’s 
Georgia, we will discover that it is the ethnic nationalism, characterized by 
aggressiveness, in reality hinders the formation of the state in the country - 
precisely for the reason that it still bears the mark of its origin and develop-
ment within the empire. We could describe this distinction as the one be-
tween “etatist” and “cultural” nationalisms, in order to avoid confusion with 
terms like “ethnic” and ”national”11. 
I have said at the very beginning that I would try to consider the phil-
osophical dimension of the issue at hand. So I will turn now to philosophy. 
Since the 1960s in the philosophical discourse a very clear accent was placed 
on differences, plurality, conflicts - at the expense of unity. This turn to differ-
ence, apart from fundamental ontological and epistemological implications, 
has political consequences as well. If any form of communal unity - and na-
tionalism here is not an exception but rather an example par excellence - im-
plies exclusion, then it also implies a possibility of emancipation, thus trig-
gering off the processes of conflicts and trespassing boundaries. This exclusion 
continues to this date - existence of ghettos in present social democracies or 
the gap between the South and the North on the global level causes unin-
terrupted dialectic of emancipative movements. It is precisely this dialectics 
that motivated philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy to raise the issue of community, 
which would be without community. Alienation, according to him, is caused 
not only by exclusion but by inclusion as well, which gives birth to the fe-
tishism of the ideas of the unity, the one, the common. The consequences of 
the worst metamorphosis of this idea in the form of totalitarianism are suffi-
ciently known. But what could a form of collective identity in such a commu-
nity without a community be? Multiculturalism, which claims to offer such a 
form, is perceived by some as the last word of the post-modern tolerance, but 
it is also criticized by others as a deconstruction of the national identity (by 
the way, this is true not only of such ‘emigrant states’ (Michael Walzer) as the 
USA and Canada, but also of such traditional nation-states as, for example, 
Germany). This further complicates the situation created around nationalism. 
What could the framework look like, which would accommodate the citizen-
ship without the belonging to the unity of the cultural values?
What could a future unity, communitas, be like which would no longer 
be based on the idea of the one, the unity, the homogeneity? One may con-
sider this question irrelevant in contemporary Georgia, but it is related to 
a more concrete series of questions. But to understand this, we should take 
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into account the context - if nationalism is directly linked to modernity, to-
day, in post-modern condition, we start discerning the signs of fundamental 
changes. The doubts about the idea of unity and homogeneity is not the only 
result of these changes; another is the doubt whether nation represents the 
necessary framework for the belonging to community and institutionaliza-
tion of citizenship; and the third is that sovereignty, a concept which was di-
rectly linked to the concepts of nation as well as the state, is losing its modern 
meaning. For example, to recall Robert Cooper’s point, the European Union 
is a highly developed system of mutual interference in domestic affairs down 
to such levels as even beer and sausages12. The problem here is not only that, 
as Cooper notes, the democracy is firmly tied to the territorial state (i.e. Eu-
rope will find it difficult to turn its back on national identity, national terri-
tories, national army, economy and democratic institutions]. The problem for 
those countries which are not yet involved in the modernization process and 
has not yet completed the building of the state and nation - and for which 
the EU is both the environment and the model - is how to coordinate these 
processes? Is the old concept of sovereignty still valid? Does not this concept 
look a little bit naïve in the context of those countries which for their survival 
depend on foreign loans, arms, expertise?13 Is the building of strong identities 
still required in the age of deconstruction of identities? 
Someone could object that European countries have gone through 
these processes and each country will have to follow them if its model and 
goal is Europe. But is not it true that these countries are not isolated from 
the western world? British video clip, Brazilian TV-series, Russian talk show, 
American film are contributing to the Imaginary of a Georgian citizen along-
side with the neighbor’s gossip and parents’ advices. And it goes without say-
ing that the majority among this plurality of sources is constituted by the 
western information and imaginary currents, which are themselves deter-
mined by a post-national constellation ( Jürgen Habermas). 
These problems should first of all be perceived by intellectuals. They 
imply questions concerning intellectuals’ role and function in this type of 
context. Should they work for establishing a national form when the post-
national imaginary - as something unknown and promising - seems to be far 
more attractive? Should they take part in ‘invention of traditions’, one of the 
main traits of which is the oblivion of the fact of their ‘inventedness’ and ‘fic-
tionality’? Should they make their own a discourse, the limitations of which 
are very clear to them? 
I will end with these questions. Without asking, intellectuals become 
ideologues. The conference was dedicated to Ilia Chavchavadze and one can 
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hardly find another writer in the Georgian literature so frequently ending his 
works with the question mark.
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